This paper studies stationary and nonstationary distributions of money holdings in a random-matching model. The first part characterizes the stationary distributions of money holdings and derives the optimum quantity of money. The second part considers nonstationary distributions of the optimum quantity of money to show that if the production costs are not too large, any distribution of the optimum quantity of money converges asymptotically to the uniform distribution.
Introduction
This paper extends the basic search-theoretic model of money developed by Wright (1991, 1993) by allowing agents to accumulate money up to the bound n ∈ N + .
First, it generalizes the result obtained in Wright (1991, 1993 ) that the optimal quantity of money is 1/2 when the upper bound is n = 1 to show that the optimal quantity of money is n/2 when the upper bound is n. Second, it demonstrates that if the production cost are not too large, any initial distribution of the optimum amount of money converges asymptotically to the uniform distribution.
Following the seminal work of Wright (1991, 1993) , several articles have either relaxed the fixed price assumption (Trejos and Wright, 1995; Shi, 1995; Berentsen, Molico, and Wright, 2000) , the one-unit constraint on money holdings (Berentsen, 2000; Rocheteau, 2000) , or both (Corbae and Camera, 1999; Green and Zhou, 1998a; Molico, 1998; Taber and Wallace, 1999; Zhou, 1999) . A further line of research has developed tractable versions of the search framework with fully divisible money (Berentsen and Rocheteau, 2000; Shi, 1997 Shi, , 1999 Lagos and Wright, 2001 ).
This paper relaxes the one-unit constraint on money holdings, but money and commodities must still exchange one for one. This intermediate step is interesting in its own right. First, it allows for an analysis of nonstationary distributions of money holdings that-with the exception of Green and Zhou (1998b) -has not been carried out yet. Second, it complements the analysis of stationary equilibria by Corbae and Camera (1999) and Zhou (1999) , where commodities are exchanged for one indivisible unit of money, by focusing on the welfare properties of these equilibria.
The model
The economy is populated by a [0, 1] continuum of infinite-lived agents who specialize in consumption and production. The commodities are indivisible and are nonstorable (to rule out commodity money). Let X i be the set of goods that agent i consumes. No agent i produces a good in X i . Moreover, for a pair of agents i and j selected at random, the probability that i produces a good in X j and also j produces a good in X i is 0 (there are no double coincidences of real wants), while the probability that i produces a good in X j but j does not produce a good in X i is x ∈ (0, 1). For example, if there are J goods and J types, J > 2, and each type i agent consumes only good i and produces only good i + 1
Consuming one unit of a consumption good in X i yields utility U > 0. Consuming one of the other commodities yields zero utility. Production of one unit of a real commodity costs C with U > C ≥ 0. In addition to the consumption goods, there is also an object called fiat money. Fiat money comes in indivisible units of size one, is storable, and cannot be consumed by any agent. Agents can accumulate money up to the bound n ∈ N + .
The model is in continuous time, and agents meet according to a Poisson process with arrival rate α. Total population is normalized to one, and the measure of agents of each type is the same, which implies that the rate at which an agent meets other agents of a particular type is αx. Denote by m i (t) the probability that at time t a randomly chosen agent has accumulated i units of money, and denote by m (t) = {m 0 (t) , ..., m n (t)} a probability measure (satisfying P n i=0 m i (t) = 1). The probability that a randomly selected agent has accumulated less than n units of money is 1 − m n (t), and the probability that he has accumulated at least one unit of money is 1 − m 0 (t). Accordingly, the rate at which an agent meets a potential buyer is p b = αx (1 − m n (t)), and the rate at which he meets a potential seller is p s = αx (1 − m 0 (t)).
Throughout the paper the quantity of money, M, is assumed to be constant. Note that for any n the quantity of money is bounded in [0, n]: If no agent holds money, the quantity of money is zero, and if all agents hold n units of money, the quantity is n. Moreover, at any point of time the probability measure m (t) must satisfy
As in Wright (1991, 1993) , money is indivisible and agents cannot hold more than one unit of money when they search for a trading opportunity. Then, if r is the rate of time preferences, the value functions satisfy
For example, the first equation sets the flow value of being an agent with no money, rV 0 , equal to the rate at which he meets an agent who buys his product, p s , times the gain of either producing for money or refusing to do so.
Definition 1 For any n > 0 and M ∈ (0, n), a stationary monetary equilibrium is a list hV, mi that satisfies the following conditions: i) V satisfies (1) taking the probability measure m as given, ii) the probability measure m is stationary taking the values function V as given, and iii) V > 0.
According to the first part of Definition 1, the monetary equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium for a given probability measure m. The second part requires that the economy be in a steady state given the selling and buying activities induced by equations (1). The third part requires that money have value.
Lemma 1 establishes the existence and uniqueness of a stationary distribution of money (stationary probability measure m) when agents accumulate money up to the bound n.
Lemma 1 For any n and M ∈ (0, n), if agents accumulate money up to the bound n, there is a unique stationary probability measure m which satisfies
Proof: See appendix. ¥ Two comments are in order here. First, a similar characterization of the stationary distribution of money holdings has been independently developed by Zhou (1999) and Camera and Corbae (1999) . Second, the uniqueness result is derived by the assumption that agents cannot spend more than one unit of money at a time. Without this restriction, there may be many other stationary distributions, including a similar class of equilibria where agents treat j < n units of money as one (Zhou 1999) .
It is well established that in this model when C > 0 there is an endogenous upper bound I (Berentsen 2000) . The existence of I is due to two properties of the model. First, 5 the marginal expected utility of money is a monotonically decreasing function of money holdings. Second, the cost of acquiring one unit of money (the production cost C) is constant. For small money holdings, the increase in the expected utility outweighs the cost, and for large money holdings, the cost is larger than the benefit. Accordingly, if C is large, I < n and agents are only willing to sell for money when i < I.
Lemma 2 For any n and money supply M ∈ (0, n), if C ≤C, whereC > 0 is defined in the proof, a unique stationary monetary equilibrium exists.
Proof: See appendix. ¥ According to Lemma 2, for any exogenous upper bound n and any quantity of money M, if the production costs are not too large, agents are willing to accumulate money up to the bound n. The uniqueness of the equilibrium is a consequence of Lemma 1.
In the following, for a given bound n the optimum amount of money and its unique stationary distribution are derived. Welfare is defined by W (M, n) = P n i=0 m i V i , which measures the ex ante expected utility of all agents (or a single agent) before money is distributed among them.
Proposition 1 For any n and money supply M ∈ (0, n), in a stationary monetary equilib- , i = 0, ..., n, maximize W (M, n).
Proof: Multiply each value function of (1) by its measure and then add the value functions to get , i = 0, ..., n. The uniform distribution then immediately implies that the optimum quantity of money is n/2. Note that Proposition 1 generalizes Wright's (1991, 1993) welfare analysis. In their models, when no barter trade is possible, the optimum amount of money is 1/2.
3
In Proposition 2 welfare maximization is constrained to stationary distributions of money. There are nonstationary distributions of the optimum quantity of money that can temporarily increase (but also decrease) the frequency of trades (and accordingly welfare).
This increase, however, is temporal, because the distribution of money converges to the unique stationary distribution associated with the optimum quantity of money, as shown in Section 3. 3 Note that the optimum quantities of money and welfare are strictly increasing in n. Thus, a social planner would choose n = I. Moreover, when r → 0, I → ∞, which implies that when r → 0 the optimum quantity of money becomes infinitely large. In this limiting economy, almost no agent is constrained by his money holdings. This result relates to Friedman's (1969) observation that an efficient monetary system requires that agents be constrained by their average flow of income, but not by immediate shortages of cash.
3 Convergence
This section studies the convergence property of the model when the optimum quantity of money is distributed. The convergence property is of interest because it gives us some intuition of whether the distribution of money matters in the long run. During the transition the endogenous bound I (t) is time dependent. If for all t we have I (t) ≥ n, the law of motion proceeds according to the following system of nonlinear differential equations:
where
Proposition 2 For any n, there is a critical valueC > 0 defined in the proof such that if C ≤C, any initial distribution of the optimum amount of money n 2 converges asymptotically to the uniform distribution.
Proposition 2 provides a sufficient condition that guarantees convergence to the stationary distribution from an arbitrary distribution of the optimum quantity of money.
The sufficient condition is essentially a restriction on the production cost that guarantees that the exogenous bound on money holdings, n, remains binding at all times, i.e., that I (t) > n for all t. The first part of the proof of Proposition 2 involves Liapounov's second method, which is described in Lemma 3. 4 Denote the gradient vector, Hf (m(t)), by
Lemma 3 Let X ⊂ < s be compact, and let g : X → X be continuous with g ( Then m is a globally stable solution to the set of nonlinear differential equationsṁ = g (m(t)).
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof involves two steps. First, it is shown that (5) is globally (asymptotically) stable if on the equilibrium path at any point of time I (t) ≥ n.
Second, a sufficient condition is derived that guarantees that during the entire transition to the stationary distribution one has I (t) ≥ n.
First step. To prove the global stability of (5) when I (t) ≥ n, one has to find a Liapounov function that is a continuous function and that satisfies conditions a) and b) of Lemma 3. In the following I show that the function f (m) = P n i=0 (m i (t) − m i ) 2 satisfies these conditions. Note, first, that X = {m ∈ I n+1 : P n i=0 m i = 1 and
} and that X is compact and convex. f (m) is continuous, and condition a) is satisfied. Condition
9 After manipulations of (7) one gets
Denote by LHS(m) (RHS(m)) the left-hand (right-hand) side of (8). For any m 0 and m n , LHS(m) is minimized when m i = (n−i)m 0 +imn n , i = 1, .., n − 1. To see this, differentiate
. Solve these equations to get
Denote byX the set of all probability measures that solve (9). Next, note that for any m ∈X, (8) holds with equality. This implies that for any m ∈ X, m / ∈X, m 0 =m 0 , and
To proceed, use P n i=0 m i = 1 and (9) to get
Next, P n i=0 im i = n 2 and (9) yield
The unique solution to (11) and (12) Second step. During the transition the endogenous bound I (t) could fall below n.
In the following a bound on C is derived, denoted byC, such that if C ≤C, at any point of time we have I (t) ≥ n. For any initial distribution m of the optimum quantity of money , denote by C m the value of C such that
To see that h (m) > 0 note that at any point of time we have
, and
. Denote bym the initial distribution of the optimum quantity of money that minimizes h (m), and denote byC the value of C such that h (m) = C. Because
for all m we have h (m) ≥C, and accordingly, if C ≤C, then I (m) ≥ n for all m. Thus, if C ≤C, at any point of time we have I (t) ≥ n. Consequently, any initial distribution of the optimum amount of money converges asymptotically to the uniform distribution. ¥ Three comments are in order here. First, the condition C ≤C is sufficient but not necessary for convergence. There are distributions that converge to the uniform distribution even when C >C. Second, as for the characterization of the stationary equilibria, the uniqueness result is derived by assuming that during the transition goods and money must exchange one for one. Without this assumption multiple equilibria are likely to occur.
Third, a redistribution of money affects welfare, although only temporarily. The welfare effect is ambiguous and depends on the initial distribution. , i = 0, ..., n, maximize welfare. This result generalizes the welfare result of Wright (1991, 1993) , where, in the absence of barter trades, the optimum amount of money is 
These conditions imply
Solving (15) . This and (14) yield (4).
I next show uniqueness of the stationary probability measure m for any n and money supply M ∈ (0, n). The first thing to note is that (3) implies ∂mn ∂m 0 < 0. Thus, for any n and m 0 there is a unique m that satisfies (2) and (3). Next, note that (4) implies that m 0 is monotonically decreasing in M (to see this note that the right-hand side of (4) , i = 1, ..., n). Accordingly, for any n and M ∈ [0, n] there is a unique probability measure m satisfying (2) and (3).
¥
Proof of Lemma 2 The proof involves two steps. First, the critical valueC is derived.
Second, existence and uniqueness are shown for C ≤C.
